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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Russia hews its own path, but where does it lead? 
Putin’s Georgian venture, which resulted in the occupation of sovereign Georgian 
territory by Russian forces, marked a watershed in relations between Russia and 
the rest of the world.  Many western state leaders and analysts have noted the 
sea change, as has the Putin-Medvedev leadership and Russian analysts as 
well.  The critical question is just what watershed has been marked.  Is this the 
beginning of a neo-Cold War, as Russia reasserts itself militarily?  Has the West 
been "unblinkered" from its hopes for partnership with a post-Soviet Russia?  Or 
has Russia, rather than demonstrating strength and assertiveness, actually 
highlighted its weaknesses with false bravado? 
 
The start of military actions remains a serious bone of contention, with new 
information surfacing from Georgian cell phone intercepts about Russian troop 
movements.  (1) However, the question of the onset of hostilities, whether Russia 
planned an invasion of Georgia through South Ossetia, or whether Georgia 
responded to provocations as it set about to "restore constitutional order" in 
South Ossetia is less relevant than the aftermath – both the situation on the 
ground in Georgia and the repercussions across the region and throughout the 
international community. 
 
Whatever the igniting spark, the actions of Russia's forces, moving into Georgia, 
occupying Georgian cities, attacking Georgian armed forces, forcing Georgian 
citizens to flee regions never previously in dispute, emphasize an aggressive 
Russian display of military superiority in a region it has attempted to have 
recognized as an area of its "sphere of influence."  The pitiful ceasefire 
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negotiations, during which the Russian president repeatedly gave his word and 
signature to agreements that were then blatantly ignored, mark the denouement 
of Russian interaction with the west.  
 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to find its place in the 
international community.  Arguments about how integration could have 
proceeded or the pace at which Russian political and military engagement with 
international institutions eventually did proceed aside, for years now Russia has 
had a strong voice, if not membership, in key international, cooperative 
economic, political, and military institutions.  And yet, when a crisis hits at its 
doorstep, all pretense of international engagement is set aside.  The Russian 
leadership's decisions regarding South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia clearly 
sidestepped every institution to which it had access, in order to promote a military 
and political agenda very much of its own making. 
 
On August 26, Russian President Medvedev recognized  "the independence of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia on behalf of the Russian Federation." In his 
statement, Medvedev claimed the mantle of international law, as well as "the UN 
Charter and OSCE documents."  (2)  Thus far, only Nicaragua has followed 
Russia's lead. (3)  In a follow-up to formal recognition, on 17 September 
Medvedev signed treaties of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
In his comments on the treaties, Medvedev reiterated—and augmented—his 
justifications for the recognition of the disputed regions of Georgia: "I signed 
these decrees [recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia] guided above all by the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations between States, and the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." (4)  
Again, the impulse to cite international standards seems to come late to Russia's 
leadership, which appears to be setting out its own policy of pre-emptive action – 
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one that permissively allows not only Russian use of force without any 
constraints, but an interpretative permissiveness of international norms. 
 
What presents the greatest concern, aside from the obvious existential 
considerations for Georgia and other former Soviet states that Russia might wish 
to claim within "its sphere," is the straight-faced façade with which Russia's 
leaders attempt to conduct this farce.   
 
In his comments during a question and answer session with participants in the 
2008 Valdai Conference, President Medvedev noted Russia's dissatisfaction with 
the post-Cold War world: "I think that we need to do everything within our power 
today to build a different security architecture. The Russian Federation, in any 
case, is not happy with the current system." (5)  Indeed,  Medvedev reiterated a 
familiar theme of needing to move from a unipolar world to a multipolar world 
system.  However, in the wake of Russian actions, more specifically the Russian 
leadership's decision not to engage the international community in its concern for 
the welfare of its citizens in South Ossetia, President Medvedev's call for a new 
system appear rather hypocritical:  "What kind of security system do we need? At 
the minimum it should be a system that complies fully with international law, not 
with the right of the strongest, but with international law. The efforts made 
throughout the twentieth century have not been in vain. Really, humanity spent 
the entire twentieth century creating the modern system of international law. We 
need to keep these laws alive in the twenty-first century." (6)  What rationale has 
Russia given its international partners to work together in order to create another 
international institution, which Russia may well simply ignore when a critical 
moment arrives? 
 
Given the egregiously faithless behavior of Russia during the continuing 
Georgian crisis:  the repeated presidential word and signature given to ceasefire 
agreements, but ignored in their implementation, the exploitation of the casualties 
in the hostilities, whose genuine suffering is distorted by the Russian media (6), 
 4 
to the pointless military excursions, including those to Venezuela and Cuba (See 
Armed Forces below) that seem designed to imitate, albeit palely, Soviet 
confrontational postures, Russia has built itself a formidable impediment to 
overcome in ever convincing its fellow members in the United Nations, G-8, 
OSCE, or even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (See Central Asia below) 
that it is indeed a reliable partner, rather than a babbling bully. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Georgia Offers Fresh Evidence on War’s Start, BY C.J. Chivers, New York 
Times, 16 Sep 08 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/world/europe/16georgia.html. 
(2) Russia recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia to save people’s lives, 26 
Aug 08, Pravda.ru via http://english.pravda.ru/russia/kremlin/26-08-2008/106214-
russia_ossetia_abkhazia-0. 
(3) South Ossetia recognition watch: Nicaragua stands alone, 5 Sep 08 Foreign 
Policy blog (a blog by the editors of Foreign Policy) via 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/9723. Belarus, Cuba, and Venezuela are said 
to be considering the move to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but 
evidently are not yet ready to commit to it. 
(4) Statement following Signing of the Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance with the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, President 
Dmitri Medvedev, 17 Sep 08 via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/09/17/1948_type82912type829 
14type82915_206565.shtml. 
(5) Transcript of the Meeting with the Participants in the International Club Valdai, 
12 Sep 08, Kremlin.ru via Johnson's Russia List, 2008-#168, 15 Sep 08. 
(6) Recent reports suggest that an even greater media chill is in the air as 
Russia's leaders, notably Prime Minister Putin, have made clear to certain media 
outlets that their coverage of the conflict in Georgian was not sufficiently 
"correct."  See, for example, The Washington Post, "In Wake of Georgian War, 
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Russian Media Feel Heat," by Philip Pan, 15 Sep 08, p. A14 via 
washingtonpost.com. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Declining foreign investor confidence in Russia’s economy 
Russia recently faced its clearest indication thus far that the oil and gas-fueled 
energy boom that had been the foundation of its resurgent economy was coming 
to an end. Since peaking last May, the RTS stock market index has fallen by 49 
percent, its lowest level in over a year, which translates to a loss of over $750 
billion for Russian businesses. (1) Similarly, the ruble dropped six percent from 
record levels set in early August. (2) 
 
In recent weeks, oil prices have plunged from $147 per barrel to around the $100 
level mark, drastically reducing Russia’s profits and minimizing its options.  As a 
result, Russia’s estimated federal revenue growth in 2009 is expected to be 
around 1.8 percent, down from 13.8 percent in 2008. (3) 
 
One major reason for the recent economic downturn is the lack of international 
confidence in Russia.  A significant factor in this loss of confidence is Moscow’s 
deployment of troops into Georgia last month and its unwillingness to honor the 
terms of its ceasefire agreements. There is a growing perception that the 
Russian leadership has become unpredictable, causing nervous investors to pull 
out of the country. A lack of foreign confidence, as reflected by the decline in 
international investment, translates into less Russian oil being exported and 
therefore less revenue flowing into the country.  In the past three weeks alone, 
over $25 billion has been withdrawn. (4) In response to the political situation and 
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this economic pressure, Russia has removed itself from negotiations to join the 
World Trade Organization, remaining the world’s largest economy that is not a 
member. (5) 
 
Russian actions in the ongoing conflict with Georgia are but one element of a 
wider pattern of government intrusion that has been eroding Russia’s reputation 
among foreign investors for decades.  Although the government often speaks of 
economic reform, Kremlin policies and official rules and regulations remain 
bureaucratic, complex, and effectively corrupt, making it confusing for outsiders, 
but easy for those who know the system to manipulate it. 
 
In the past, Russia’s vast natural energy resources have encouraged foreign 
investors to overlook these issues, but there is no guarantee that this trend will 
continue as the investment climate becomes less and less hospitable.  In the 
past year, potential investors have witnessed not only Russia’s haste to respond 
violently to alleged Georgian aggression, but also a propensity for attacking its 
own firms.  Last July, Prime Minister Putin caused the value of privately-owned 
Russian mining firm Mechel’s stock to fall 38% in one day after he indicated that 
the Russian Anti-Monopoly Service should pay special attention to Mechel’s 
domestic pricing. (6) Igor Zyuzin, Mechel’s CEO and major shareholder, had no 
way to refute Putin’s claims, and most likely had no interest in doing so, as the 
Russian government has unpleasant ways of “reigning in” dissenting 
businessmen. 
 
Perhaps the most high profile warning against foreign investment is the dispute 
between TNK-BP partner firms Alpha-Access Renova (AAR), a business 
conglomerate run by a quartet of Russian oligarchs, and British Petroleum (BP). 
When TNK-BP was created in November 2003, the six billion dollar joint venture 
united each company’s already-extensive holdings in the region, resulting in the 
third largest oil company in Russia in both volume of reserves, which at the time 
was approximately 9.5 billion barrels, and annual oil production. (7) 
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The most unique aspect of TNK-BP was that it remained privately-owned and 
run, no small feat in an era when the Russian government had managed to 
minimize foreign investment power by retaining at least part-ownership of most of 
the large firms responsible for processing and distributing its natural resources. 
 
After the Kremlin pressured the Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil Company into selling 
majority control of its operations to state-run Gazprom in December 2006, TNK-
BP was left as the only major foreign-owned company in Russia.  This distinction, 
along with the fact that a contract-mandated five-year moratorium on the sale of 
TNK-BP shares to outside parties expired on 1 January 2008, has led both 
parties to believe that each is working with the Russian government to force the 
other out. BP, in particular, fueled suspicion by starting talks with Gazprom on a 
number of joint projects immediately after the ban was lifted. (8) 
 
Throughout the dispute between AAR and BP, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin 
(who also heads the oil firm Rosneft) pledged that the Russian government 
would not become involved in a dispute with a privately owned firm. However, 
this pledge did not prevent TNK-BP’s offices from being raided several times by 
Kremlin security agents in June, after which TNK-BP’s American CEO Robert 
Dudley was questioned about business practices by Interior Ministry prosecutors 
in Moscow for over five hours. (9) Soon after, several BP executives, including 
Dudley, discovered that their requests for work permit extensions had been 
denied on the basis of a lack of valid work contracts, forcing them to leave 
Russia at the end of July. (10) BP labeled this incident as another attempt by 
AAR to manipulate the Russian state bureaucracy, in order to create a situation 
in which TNK-BP could be sold to either Gazprom or Rosneft, placing it under 
Russian state control. 
 
Two weeks ago, BP and AAR negotiated a deal in which Dudley agreed to resign 
before the end of the year.  A director approved by TNK-BP’s board of directors, 
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which has been restructured to include four members from AAR, four from BP, 
and three “independent” seats, will replace him in 2009.  There is no word yet on 
how the independent board members will be selected.  In exchange, BP will 
retain its position as a secure partner in the venture, as well as its access to 
Russian oil, an outcome considered positive by analysts who had assumed that 
the company would lose everything to a state-orchestrated takeover. (11) Even 
though BP’s role has been marginalized, government representatives continue to 
maintain that the agreement between the two partners was reached without any 
state involvement. 
 
Despite Russia’s value as an energy producer, the Kremlin’s behavior of late, 
including ignoring long-standing contracts, raising prices in favor of state 
protectionism, and ignoring the rule of law, may discourage potential investors.  
President Medvedev insists that the current economic situation could be turned 
around “if the right decisions are made” (12).  However, just what these “right 
decisions” might be, remains to be seen. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Charles Clover, Catherine Belton and Rachel Morajee, “Medvedev and $10bn 
injection fail to stem fall in Russia's stocks,” Financial Times, 11 Sep 08 via 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bebeb5b6-7f99-11dd-a3da-000077b07658.html. Last 
accessed 14 Sep 08. 
(2) Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia stock market fall is said to imperil oil boom,” New 
York Times, 13 Sep 08 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/13/business/worldbusiness/13russia.html?ref=e
urope. Last accessed 14 Sep 08. 
(3) Kramer, “Russia stock market fall is said to imperil oil boom,” ibid.  
(4) Alexei Bayer, “What foreign investors fear the most,” The Moscow Times, 12 
Sep 08 via http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/370890.htm. Last 
accessed 14 Sep 08. 
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(5) Andrew E. Kramer, “BP makes deep concessions in agreement with Russian 
partner,” New York Times, 5 Sep 08 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/05/business/worldbusiness/05venture.html 
?ref=business. Last accessed 14 Sep 08. 
(6) Domenic J. Strazzulla, “Mechel: Putin’s remarks create an opportunity for an 
attractive volatility play,” Seeking Alpha, 25 Jul 08 via 
http://seekingalpha.comarticle/87069-mechel-putins-remarks-create-opportunity-
for-an-attractive-volatility-play.  Last accessed 14 Sep 08. 
(7) “Alfa Grp, Access/Renova and BP to create new company,” Pravda, 02 Nov 
03 via http://english.pravda.ru/comp/2003/02/11/43257.html.  Last accessed 30 
Jul 08. 
(8) Anil Dawar, “Russia supported Litvinenko murder, says security official,” The 
Guardian, 8 Jul 08 via 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/08/russia.foreignpolicy. Last accessed 
30 Jul 08.  
(9) Luke Harding, “Russian head of British Council group arrested,” The 
Guardian, 21 Mar 08 via 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/21/russia.foreignpolicy.  Last 
accessed 31 Aug 08. 
(10) “Boss of BP Russia venture leaves,” BBC News, 24 Jul 08 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/7524153.stm.  Last accessed 30 Jul 
08. 
(11) Kramer, “BP makes deep concessions in agreement with Russian partner,” 
ibid.  
(12) Clover, Belton, Morajee, ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military power projection: The pace quickens    
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On 24 August, the USS McFaul, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, 
pulled into the port of Batumi, Georgia and delivered over 150,000 pounds of 
humanitarian relief supplies in response to the recent regional conflict. (1) The 
Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that it viewed this and subsequent US naval 
activity in the Black Sea with a great deal of suspicion.  A Kremlin spokesman 
questioned the dual role of another vessel, the USS Mount Whitney, a highly 
sophisticated command and control warship, off-loading humanitarian supplies 
near the port of Poti. (2) The port’s military side suffered heavy damage where 
Russian soldiers stripped and looted everything from armchairs to toilets.  In 
addition, eight Georgian naval vessels were sunk in the harbor, including the 
Georgian flagship and missile boat Dioskuria. (3) 
 
One of the first post-conflict casualties was the cancellation (after the US and UK 
threatened boycotts) of the annual FRUKUS (France-Russia-United Kingdom-
United States) combined naval exercise.  This exercise was scheduled for 
August 2008 and was to involve at least four ships and around 1,000 military 
personnel. Typically, these exercises focus on training scenarios on land and at 
sea and historically have acted as a tool to promote dialog between the 
international military forces concerned. (4) 
 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned of unspecified actions in response to the 
US aid shipments.  On 8 September, Russia publicly announced it would deploy 
a naval task force to the Caribbean Sea, in order to conduct training exercises 
with the Venezuelan military.  The exercise is slated to involve the missile cruiser 
Peter the Great, at least three other Russian ships, and several long range anti-
submarine aircraft to be based at a Venezuelan airfield. (5) Captain 1st Rank Igor 
Dygalo noted this combined force exercise would focus on, “…maneuvering, 
search-and-rescue, and communications.” (6) While on the surface it appears the 
timing of this exercise is in direct response to the US naval activity in the Black 
Sea, it is likely this international exercise was coordinated and planned well 
before the Russian incursion into Georgia. However, it also is likely the timing of 
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Russia’s announcement of this exercise is both calculated and directly aimed at 
meeting Putin’s attempt to project Russian military power.   
 
The Russian military also has increased its pace of power projection in the air.  
For instance, NATO fighter squadrons in Norway conducted 13 emergency 
sorties to meet “visiting” Russian bombers in 2006; this number more than tripled 
to 47 responses in 2007.  Russian flights continue, and Norwegian Air Force 
officials report that its fighter interceptor launches to “shadow” Russian bombers 
in international airspace do not show any signs of slowing down. (7) 
 
Additionally, the Russian Air Force landed two TU-160 “White Swan” (NATO 
reporting name “Blackjack”) bombers in Venezuela on 10 September 2008. This 
deployment, under the auspices of a training and maneuver exercise, represents 
the first time Russian strategic bombers have landed in the Western Hemisphere 
since the end of the Cold War. (8)  Similar discussions and reports have been 
circulating for the last few months on Russian aircraft using airfields in Cuba for 
transient bombers to refuel and conduct operations in the region. (9) Again, the 
timing, announcement, and actual deployment to Venezuela clearly is calculated 
to project Russia’s power in the US “backyard.” 
 
Not to be outdone by his Navy and Air Force counterparts, Russian Strategic 
Missile Forces Commander Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov reiterated recently 
that Russia possesses superior missiles to take on the planned US missile 
defense sites in Eastern Europe. Colonel General Solovtsov added that Russia’s 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, specifically its Topol-Ms, could change their 
launch configurations easily to target and overwhelm the US missile defense 
system’s interceptor missiles destined for Poland and its accompanying radar 
system slated for the Czech Republic. (10) 
 
Within the context of this saber-rattling, recent hints that Russia might work 
actively to hamper on-going combat operations in Afghanistan suggest an 
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escalation of confrontational posturing, as Russia attempts to blunt NATO's 
ability to project military power.  Speaking at NATO headquarters in Brussels, 
Dmitri Rogozin remarked at a press conference, “Future cooperation [in 
Afghanistan] will depend on the alliance’s position in the Caucasus crisis.” (11) 
With NATO operating in the land-locked country of Afghanistan, issues such as 
Russian cooperation for overflight and overland (truck or rail) transport are 
important to support its fielded forces. 
 
Prime Minister Putin’s reference to a response to US humanitarian operations in 
Georgia and incursions in the “near abroad” have been attempts to project 
Russia’s military might.  The key question that arises from Putin’s response is 
whether Russia will be able to maintain its increased military operational tempo 
or even augment its pace.     
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “USS McFaul Brings Aid to Batumi, Georgia,” US 6th Fleet Public Affairs, 24 
Aug 08 via http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=39317.  
(2) “Russian FM raises doubts about purpose of US warship’s visit to Black Sea,” 
ITAR-TASS, 06 Sep 08 via http://www.itar-
tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13045318.  
(3) “U.S. Navy ship anchors outside Georgia,” Associated Press, 05 Sep 08 via 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26562617.  
(4) “Russia-NATO naval drill called off after U.S., U.K. boycott,” RIA Novosti, 14 
Aug 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080814/116034048-print.html.  
(5) “Russia to send naval squadron, planes to Venezuela,” Vladimir Isachenkov 
[Associated Press], 08 Sep 08 via 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/world/5989652.html.  
(6) “Russia says its Navy ready to thwart any threat to security,” RIA Novosti, 09 
Sep 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080909/116641317-print.html.  
(7) “Russian bombers fly in Europe’s far north,” Pierre-Henry Deshayes [Agence 
France Presse], 01 Sep 08 via 
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http://www.newsmax.com/international/nato_russia_norway/2008/09/02/126927.
html.  
(8) “No nukes for Russian bombers in Venezuela,” Associated Press, 11 Sep 08, 
via http://www.comcast.net/articles/news-world- 
europe/20080911/Russia.Venezuela.Bombers.  
(9) “Russia Mulls regular Bomber Flights to Cuba: Report,” Agence France-
Presse, 21 Jul 08 via http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3636724.  
(10) “Russia could target missiles at sites in Central Europe,” RIA Novosti, 10 
Sep 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080910/116678626-print.html.  
(11) “Russia may suspend support for NATO operations in Afghanistan,” RIA 
Novosti, 04 Sep 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080904/116542151-print.html. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Fabian Adami 
 
FSB & Georgia 
In the weeks following the Russian invasion of Georgia, it has become clear that 
the FSB had significant involvement in the conflict, on a multitude of levels. 
 
On 20 August, FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov met with President Dmitri 
Medvedev. The purpose of the meeting, coming just days after the outbreak of 
hostilities, reportedly was to inform the president that the FSB had smashed a 
significant Georgian espionage operation in Russia. According to Bortnikov, the 
FSB arrested some 20 individuals who had been conducting “active” operations 
against the Russian military. Bortnikov claimed that Georgian operatives had 
been “reconnoitering military facilities and preparing acts of terror,” which they 
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were aiming to carry out on the “territory of the Russian Federation, ” as well as 
in South Ossetia. (1) At the time of writing, only one of the men arrested has 
been named. Described simply as a “senior officer,” Mikhail Khachidze (2) is an 
ethnic Georgian serving in the Russian army, who allegedly was collecting 
“secret information,” including combat readiness reports and personnel 
information on units stationed in the North Caucasus. (3) Khachidze is to be 
charged with High Treason under Clause 275 of Russian military law, (4) and will 
face trial once the investigation into his activities is completed. 
 
Addressing the heads of regional anti-terror committees at a meeting in Nizhny 
Novgorod, FSB Director Bortnikov claimed that Al Qaeda, as well as other 
extremist groups had attempted to take advantage of the situation in the 
secessionist areas to carry out anti-Russian action in Dagestan, Ingushetia and 
Chechnya, and that this was prevented only by timely action from Russian 
Security Agencies. (5) Bortnikov alleged that some of these groups had 
attempted, and could continue to attempt, to penetrate the Russian Federation 
through the secessionist regions of Georgia.  (6) 
 
The latter part of Bortnikov’s statement in this instance was very interesting. The 
FSB Director claimed that Russia was fighting against the “evil” of international 
terrorism in South Ossetia, something that “concerns humankind all over the 
world.” (7) Taken together, the comments outlined above demonstrate what 
Russia’s tactics are in the current situation. 
 
First, the implication is that Russia believed that a Georgian attack was imminent, 
and therefore acted preemptively, and defensively. Secondly, Bortnikov’s 
comments constitute an attempt to link the conflict to the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Clearly, Russia’s leaders hope that these ex-post-facto “justifications” 
of its actions will immunize the Kremlin from Western criticism. Look—so the cry 
is—we are just like you! 
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Addendum 
FSB Special Forces were involved in the incursions into South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and Georgia proper. According to Colonel-General Yevgeni Lovyrev, a 
number of officers have been decorated for “courage and heroism,” while 
contributing to the “successful conduct of the operation to compel the aggressor 
to peace.”  (8) Although their precise roles likely will remain secret for a long 
time, it is safe to assume that their duties included demolition, sabotage, 
advanced reconnaissance, etc. Whilst the agency has not been mentioned in the 
Russian press, it is also safe to assume that GRU special operations units were 
involved in some way in the incursions. 
 
Weapons to Syria? 
Late in August, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and President Dmitri Medvedev 
met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the presidential residence in Sochi. 
The purpose of the talks was primarily to discuss the possibility of a new arms 
deal between the two countries. 
 
Speaking to the press on the fringes of the meeting, Lavrov stated that Russia 
would “consider” Syria’s weapons requirements, and attempted to pre-empt any 
concerns that might arise in the United States or Israel about the deal by insisting 
that Russia would sell only “defensive” weapons to Damascus, so as not to 
“upset the balance of forces in the region.” (9) 
 
Precisely what weapons Syria covets is unclear, but it is safe to assume, in light 
of recent Israeli air-strikes, that Surface to Air Missiles (reportedly BUK M1 & 
Pantsyr S1), as well as anti-tank weapons are on Damascus’ wish list. (10) 
 
A week after the Presidents had met, Igor Belyaev, charge d’affaires in 
Damascus, noted that the Russian Navy will be making increased use of Tartus 
and other Syrian ports in the Mediterranean, in an attempt to heighten Russia’s 
presence in that region. (11) At this stage, it is unclear whether berthing facilities 
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for the navy constitute part payment for weapons or not, but the deal is yet 
another indication that Russia’s desire to show its military machismo through 
fleet sorties, bomber sorties and the like remains undiminished. That the quality 
of hardware on display clearly is second-rate is not Moscow’s concern. What 
matters is the symbolism of a reassertive Russia.  
 
Coddling Turkey?  
Early in September, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid a one-day visit to 
Istanbul to meet Ali Babacan, his Turkish counterpart. The goal of the visit was 
primarily to clear the air. The two countries have been engaged in a “customs 
dispute” over the last month that has resulted in billions of dollars in Turkish 
goods languishing in trucks along the border. (12) 
 
Allegations have been aired that the dispute was the result of Turkey’s pro-
Georgian stance in the recent conflict, and most pointedly, of Istanbul’s decision 
to allow US warships carrying humanitarian supplies to transit the Bosphorus. 
(13) 
 
In a press conference with Babacan, Lavrov was at pains to deny this allegation. 
Lavrov claimed that Russia was “not discriminating” against Turkey, and that 
Istanbul’s prior recognition of Kosovo’s independence (directly linked to the 
conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Moscow’s rhetoric) “had no effect on 
bilateral and regional cooperation” between the neighbors. Nor, apparently, does 
Turkey’s NATO membership. (14) 
 
Lavrov further noted that Russia was committed fully to reaching the target of 
$25 billion in trade for 2008 and explained that customs issues had arisen with a 
number of countries, forcing Russia to tighten controls across the board. (15) 
 
When compared to the harsh language fired off towards the US and the 
European Union over Georgia, Russia’s attitude towards Turkey is positively 
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soothing.  Not only did Lavrov expound on trade between the two countries, he 
also praised the Turkish proposal for a Caucasus Alliance to discuss and solve 
regional conflicts, albeit noting that some “conditions” would have to be met 
before such a system could begin functioning. The proposed organization would 
include Georgia, Russia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. (16) 
 
The reason for Russia’s friendly tone is that Turkey has a “key position in 
transferring oil and natural gas” from Russia to the consumer markets: a ban on 
Russian shipping through the Bosphorus would damage Russia’s economy 
severely.  (17) If the European Union carries through its threat to impose 
sanctions on Russia due to the Caucasus conflict, the tanker route through 
Turkish waters would assume central importance.  In light of this fact, Moscow’s 
tone towards Turkey must be viewed as purely tactical in nature: the goal is to 
have a back-up export plan in place, in case of sanctions.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “FSB Detains Officer Suspected of Spying For Georgia,” ITAR-TASS, 20 Aug 
08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(2) “Officer Accused of Spying For Georgia,” The Moscow Times, 21 Aug 08 via 
www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/370158.htm. 
(3) “Kommersant.com headline: FSB Unmasked Georgian Spy in Russia’s Army-
Kommersant Moscow,” 20 Aug 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(4) Ibid.  
(5) “Georgia Steps Up Reconnaissance, Sabotage in Russia-FSB Director,” 
ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 28 Aug 08; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) Ibid.  
(7) “Russian Security Chief Warns of Possible Terror Attacks in S. Ossetia, 
Abkhazia,” Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 4 Sept 08; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
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Weapons-Lavrov,” Interfax, 21 Aug 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
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Aug 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
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08; Reuters via Lexis-Nexis.   
(12) “Turkey, Russia to Work on Simplified Customs to Overcome Trade Row, 
Report by Irem Koker: ‘Turkey, Russia to work on simplified customs to 
overcome trade row,’” Hurriyet, 2 Sept 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World 
News Connection.  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) “Turkey’s NATO Membership Does Not Impede Relations With Russia-
Lavrov,” Itar-Tass, 2 Sept 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(15) Ibid.  
(16) “Turkey, Russia to Work on Simplified Customs to Overcome Trade Row, 
Report by Irem Koker: ‘Turkey, Russia to work on simplified customs to 
overcome trade row,’” Hurriyet, 2 Sept 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World 
News Connection.  
(17) “Turkish Foreign Minister Believes Trade Problems With Russia To Be 
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Solved,’” Anatolia, 2 Sept 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Rattled pipelines: EU reconsiders its energy ties to Russia 
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As Russian tanks rolled across the border into Georgia early in August, 
European heads of state were faced with a terrible truth: The influence of the EU 
in Moscow has waned to such extent that it is incapable of halting a Russian 
rampage through the Caucasus. On September 1, French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy convened the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels to mull over 
the crisis and to coordinate a European response. The document that emerged 
from the meeting contains both a condemnation of Russia’s recent acts of 
aggression and an indictment of failed EU policies that leave Europe in thrall to 
Russia. (1) The Council pledged to find alternative energy suppliers and to build 
independent supply lines in a broad effort to move Europe away from its current 
dependence on Russian oil and gas. 
 
Untenable dependence 
For years, analysts have been warning that dependence on Russian energy 
supplies is a politically untenable proposition. Last year, Russia supplied 38% of 
Europe’s gas and 33% of its oil. (2) By the year 2030 those numbers are 
expected to double, as domestic sources dry up and Russia extends its supply 
lines deeper into the distribution networks of western Europe. (3) At present, 
there is no infrastructure in place to check this trend. Without a common energy 
policy, each country has to secure energy supplies through bilateral deals with 
Russia. (4) Negotiations for energy supply contracts effectively have split EU 
member countries into opposing camps—Gazprom’s junior partners vs. end-use 
customers. (5) Because of its natural gas exports, Russia has gained a powerful 
point of leverage in its political relations with European consumer countries. Tied 
to Russia by a web of energy deals, but divided among themselves, EU countries 
have proven unable, or unwilling, to issue a unanimous challenge to Moscow. (6) 
That is why, alongside its resolution to put an end to “business as usual” in EU-
Russian relations, the members of the Council committed their governments to 
work toward a united energy policy that will ensure Europe’s energy security in 
the long term. 
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Calls for diversification 
As an exceptional energy market not dominated by Russian supplies, the UK has 
a greater freedom to speak out against the policies of Moscow. At the 
Extraordinary European Council, Prime Minister Gordon Brown urged EU leaders 
to secure alternative sources of energy in the near future. “We must build 
relations with other oil and gas producers more quickly,” Brown said. (7) What 
European countries are seeking is a way to bring gas from Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan to Europe without relying upon Russia, which currently controls all 
pipelines linking Central Asia and the EU. For gas to flow west without Russian 
interference, the EU must have an independent pipeline running through 
Georgia. 
 
Georgia is not a major energy player. But, the country that lacks significant 
petroleum reserves nevertheless has fashioned itself as an independent transit 
route for Central Asian oil and gas volumes, a friendly corridor set between 
Russia to the north and Iran to the south. Two Western-operated pipelines run 
across Georgia already. They give Georgia a crucial role to play in energy 
markets, but they also serve as a lightning rod for Russian aggression. Many 
analysts suspect that a key Russian motive for invading Georgia was to expose 
the region’s instability (by fostering instability) and to forestall any new pipeline 
developments there. (8) 
 
In Georgia, Russian troops appeared in areas near oil and gas pipelines, far from 
the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the ostensible 
conflict was centered. Russian jets fired over fifty missiles at an oil pipeline—but 
missed their target. (9) The message, though, did not miss its mark: Georgia is 
portrayed as too unstable to host fragile pipelines.  In the midst of the ruckus, the 
Turkish portion of the pipeline was sabotaged by restive Kurds. In the weeks 
following the Georgian conflict, Iran’s concern for the fragile ecosystem of the 
Caspian Sea induced it to veto a Western bid to extend a pipeline carrying oil 
and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan across the seafloor to connect with 
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pipelines in Georgia. EU members, looking to the country as a route for 
increased volumes of Central Asian oil and gas flowing west, surely realize that 
their project for energy security will be more difficult than expected. If the 
project’s financial backers should decide that the Georgian transit corridor is too 
fraught with risk and leave the field to Russia, then Moscow can declare its 
Georgian campaign a victory. 
 
Considering the importance of Europe’s energy markets to Moscow, talk in 
Brussels about finding alternative supply lines can be seen as a rebuke couched 
in terms that Moscow will appreciate. Or, the revival of alternative pipeline 
schemes may be rhetorical balm soothing the sting of recognition that future 
energy security in Europe depends upon keeping good relations with Russia 
resurgent. The words of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev are enough to send 
a chill through any would-be challenger: “[Russia] will use all the economic 
leverage and resources at its disposal, and specific advantages, for the 
protection of its national interests.” (10) But Russia needs an outlet for its gas, 
and Moscow points out that it never cut energy supplies to paying customers, 
even in the darkest days of the Cold War. Europe can take some cold comfort in 
that. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Doc. 12594/08, Presidency Conclusions, Extraordinary European Council, 
Brussels. 1 Sep 08 via: 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf. 
(2) IEA Press Release, 4 Sep 08 via: 
(http://www.iea.org/Textbase/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=331). 
(3) Ibid. The IEA anticipates a doubling of European dependence on Russian 
energy supplies by 2030. 
(4) Gazprom is the largest or second-largest shareholder in the gas utilities of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Zeyno Baran, “EU Energy Security: Time to End 
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Russian Leverage,” The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2007 via 
(www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_baran.pdf). 
(5) Ibid. Since 2005, Gazprom has signed deals with Eni (Italy), Gasunie (the 
Netherlands), BASF (Germany), E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany), and Gaz de France. 
(6) Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy reacted to the Georgian conflict by drawing 
Russia closer into the European family. “Berlusconi to Cheney: Italy Headed Off 
New Cold War,” Bloomberg News; Republished in NY Sun, 10 Sep 08 via 
(http://www.nysun.com/foreign/berlusconi-to-cheney-italy-headed-off-new-cold-
war/85497/). 
(7) Gordon Brown, “Written Ministerial Statements” Extraordinary European 
Council: Georgia/Russia, 10 Sep 08 via 
(http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wms/?id=2008-09-10a.127WS.4). 
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a%20Russia%20pipeline&st=cse). 
(9) “Russian jets targeted major oil pipeline-Georgia,” Reuters. 9 Aug 08 via 
(http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L9618164.htm). 
(10) Mikhail Zygar, Vladimir Solovyev, “Medvedev’s Message to Ambassadors,” 
Kommersant, 22 Jun 08 via 
(http://www.kommersant.com/p913733/Russian_foreign_policy_international_rela
tions/). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Russian forces withdraw partially as opposition takes aim 
Russian troops have withdrawn from several checkpoints around Poti and 
Senaki, in keeping with an 8 September commitment between Russian President 
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Dmitri Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Russia would pull 
out of those positions by September 15. However, Russian military forces remain 
stationed beyond the pre-conflict positions stipulated in the original Sarkozy 
agreement of mid-August. The more recent discussions yielded a commitment by 
Medvedev to remove Russian troops stationed beyond Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia within ten days of the deployment of EU observers to those regions. The 
8 September negotiations call for EU monitors to be in place no later than 1 
October. (1) The official document recording the 8 September agreements calls 
for EU observers to be stationed in zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, although Saakashvili has stated that a second-stage deployment would 
post EU monitors within the separatist regions themselves. (2) 
 
NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer arrived in the Georgian capital on 15 
September and signed an agreement with Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze 
establishing a NATO-Georgia Commission, designed to facilitate increased 
NATO contact with Tbilisi. While there, Scheffer criticized the Sarkozy 
agreements on the grounds that they permitted Russia to maintain troops in the 
separatist Georgian territories. (3) He also called on Georgia to push ahead with 
democratic reforms and be a “predictable, responsible partner,” even “when 
others are acting irresponsibly.”  (4) 
 
At the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid visits to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia on 14 and 15 September. The stated purpose of Lavrov’s visit 
was to lay the groundwork for establishing embassies in the regions, which 
Russia unilaterally recognized as independent on 26 August. De facto Abkhaz 
president Sergei Bagapsh recently requested that Russian troops be stationed in 
Abkhazia, declaring that the old Russian bases in Gudauta and Ochamchire 
would be used to house the troops. (5) 
 
International talks on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are scheduled to take place in 
Geneva on 15 October. The agenda envisaged by the Sarkozy agreement 
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includes regional security and stability, as well as the return of refugees. Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov has called for the inclusion of South Ossetian and 
Abkhaz representatives in the discussions. (6) In the meantime, the West, 
represented by the United States and the European Union, has presented aid 
packages to back up its rhetoric in support of Georgia’s sovereignty, with 
Washington and Brussels proposing $1 billion and €500 million, respectively. (7) 
 
Russian officials continue to claim that the fighting began with a Georgian 
offensive upon the South Ossetian main city of Tskhinvali and surrounding 
towns, while Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has presented evidence 
demonstrating that Russian troops moved into Georgian territory early on the 
morning of 7 August, hours before the Georgian offensive began. (8) 
 
Although domestic support for Saakashvili is strong in the face of this national 
threat, Georgia’s opposition politicians are renewing their offensive on the 
president. Saakashvili appears to have anticipated the move and has introduced 
several initiatives aimed at drawing opposition support. 
 
The leaders of two different political parties have called (separately) for 
Saakashvili’s resignation. Shalva Natelashvili, the colorful leader of Georgia’s 
Labor Party, demanded Saakashvili’s resignation at a press conference on 8 
September. (9) This was followed the next day by similar demands from David 
Gamkrelidze, head of the New Rights Party, who called for new elections. (10) 
Former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili (now living in France) has seconded 
the calls for Saakashvili’s resignation and stated his intention to return to Georgia 
“within a year.” (11) 
 
Criticism of Saakashvili from Georgia’s disparate opposition is nothing new, 
although the political grandstanding has increased in response to the events of 
last month. It is, on the other hand, the statements of Saakashvili’s erstwhile 
comrade-in-arms, former Speaker of the Parliament and Rose Revolutionary 
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Nino Burdjanadze, that portend stormy weather on Saakashvili’s domestic 
political horizon. Burdjanadze announced a mere ten days after the outbreak of 
hostilities that Saakashvili would have to face “tough questions” and that she, 
although having chosen not to participate in May’s parliamentary elections, would 
play an “active political role.” (12) She followed up her statements early in 
September by calling for an investigation into the origins of the war and whether 
it was avoidable. (13) The former speaker, despite an active political career 
under both President Saakashvili and former President Eduard Shevardnadze, 
has survived the Georgian political stage with much of her credibility intact. In the 
last year, she often has taken the role of mediator between the “united” 
opposition and President Saakashvili. 
 
Prior to the calls for his resignation, Saakashvili’s administration had made 
attempts to placate the opposition. On 29 August, the president proposed the 
formation of an anti-crisis group, composed of government representatives, 
members of the opposition and civil society participants. (14) The purpose of the 
group would be to monitor the distribution of foreign aid to Georgians affected by 
the fighting. 
 
The authorities followed up the anti-crisis group initiative by inviting political 
parties to sign a document entitled the “Charter of Politicians of Georgia.” The 
charter committed its signatories to the following four principles: 1) The territorial 
integrity of Georgia, 2) NATO membership and integration into the European 
Union, 3) adherence to the Constitution and national security interests, and 4) the 
formation of the anti-crisis council. (15)  The document was signed by the ruling 
party and several others, but was dismissed as propaganda by the Labor and 
Republican parties.  
 
In response to the opposition’s objections, Saakashvili has offered to increase 
the powers of the anti-crisis group. “I am ready to delegate some of the executive 
government’s powers to this Council, including the right to sign [documents]; it 
 26 
can send representatives to various ministries,” Saakashvili said on 10 
September. (16) Additionally, in his State of the Nation address on 16 
September, the president reiterated his willingness to work with the opposition 
and announced new reforms aimed at expanding private property rights, 
strengthening of an independent judiciary, and curtailing the president’s right to 
dissolve parliament. (17)  The proposals mentioned in the speech certainly would 
be a leap in the right direction for Georgia’s democratic transition; however, the 
address was noticeably meager on details about how the state would achieve 
those goals. 
 
Although the most vocal opposition groups are unlikely to respond favorably to 
Saakashvili’s overtures, neither are they likely to pose a significant threat to the 
president in the current crisis environment. However, should Burdjanadze choose 
to push the issue, Saakashvili’s position could become less secure, if the threat 
to national security were viewed as deescalating. 
 
Source Notes:  
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Georgia via http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19520. 
(5) “Abkhazia will be able to host brigade of RF troops—Bagapsh,” 8 Sep 08, 
ITAR-TASS via http://www.itar-
tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13049406&PageNum=1. 
(6) “Moscow Wants Sokhumi, Tskhinvali to Take Part in Geneva Talks,” 15 Sep 
08, Civil Georgia via http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19503. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Central Asia’s response to Georgian situation leaves Russia wanting more  
Roughly three weeks after Russia’s invasion of Georgia, the Central Asian 
governments finally formulated their first official response to the situation, under 
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the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) annual summit 
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on 28 August.  Despite many predictions to the contrary, 
the six SCO member states did not condone Russia’s attack on Georgia in their 
joint declaration, but instead condemned the use of force in resolving regional 
conflicts and emphasized the importance of international diplomacy and 
cooperation in settling disputes, as well as stressing the need to respect all 
countries’ territorial integrity.   The declaration made no attempt to assign blame 
for the conflagration; in fact, other than endorsing Russia’s role as “peacemaker” 
in the Caucasus, the SCO’s view on the situation in Georgia was remarkably 
neutral: “The SCO member states express their deep concern in connection with 
the recent tension over the South Ossetian issue, and urge the relevant parties to 
resolve the existing problems peacefully through dialogue and to make efforts to 
reconcile [with one another] and facilitate negotiations. The SCO member states 
welcome the approval on 12 August 2008 in Moscow of six principles of settling 
the conflict in South Ossetia and support the active role of Russia in promoting 
the peace and cooperation in this region.” (1) 
 
The statement made frequent mention of the UN’s pivotal role in finding peaceful 
solutions to international crises, as well as repeatedly referring to the need for the 
SCO’s member states to strengthen their cooperation in the fight against the 
three-headed monster of “terrorism, separatism and extremism,” (2) undoubtedly 
a reference to the three Ferghana Valley states’ struggles with both armed 
incursions and protest demonstrations by domestic opposition groups, as well as 
China’s troubles in Tibet and Xingjian.  The potential for territorial disputes and 
separatist movements also exists in all of the Central Asian states: Kazakhstan 
possesses a sizeable Russian minority, Uzbekistan is home to a large Tajik 
minority (and the question of whether Bukhara and Samarqand should rightfully 
belong to Tajikistan still simmers), Tajikistan’s Uzbek minority makes up 20-25% 
of the republic’s total population, and Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are also 
home to many Uzbeks (13.9% and 5%, respectively). (3)  Kyrgyzstan’s and 
Tajikistan’s portions of the Ferghana Valley, which possesses some of the most 
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arable, and therefore most desirable land in the region, are heavily populated by 
Uzbeks.  In the Sughd (formerly Leninobod) and Osh Provinces, which are the 
most developed and prosperous areas of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks also 
outnumber the titular populations.  To complicate matters even further, 
Kyrgyzstan possesses small enclaves of Uzbek and Tajik territory within its own 
borders.  Thus, justifying, much less condoning, foreign military intervention on 
behalf of an ethnic minority would place the other five SCO states in a very 
precarious position, possibly even sparking new inter-ethnic conflicts.  The 
Russian government still is able to wield a great deal of influence over the 
Central Asian states, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but Russia’s 
power pales alongside the specter of further inter-ethnic turmoil and civil strife in 
these countries, most of which already have endured more than their share of 
violent unrest. 
 
Furthermore, although Central Asia’s ties to Russia are still strong, all five states 
have been cultivating their relationships with China, whose investments in the 
Central Asian market continue to grow.  Following a meeting with Kazakhstan’s 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev on the eve of the Olympic Games in Beijing, 
Chinese president Hu Jintao conferred with his Kyrgyz and Tajik counterparts on 
the sidelines of the SCO summit and then traveled to Turkmenistan for a 
rendezvous with President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow.  Only the talks with 
Turkmenistan’s president seemed to produce any concrete results, leading to 
another increase in the capacity of the Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline, 
from 30 billion cubic meters to a planned total of 40 billion. (4)  However, 
although Hu Jintao’s meeting with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon may not 
have led to any significant new Chinese investments, it did produce a 17-point 
“Joint Declaration” emphasizing the need for greater cooperation between the 
two countries on such issues as the illegal narcotics trade, terrorism, the 
demarcation of the Tajik-Chinese border, strengthening of bilateral trade, as well 
as the Tajik government’s full support for the “one China policy.” (5) Chinese 
investment in Tajikistan’s industry and infrastructure would no doubt be received 
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with open arms, and it is undoubtedly safe to say that the same is true of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The Central Asian states were given an opportunity to revise their view on 
Russia’s actions against Georgia one week later, at the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting in Moscow, on 5 September. (6) The 
CSTO, which is comprised solely of former Soviet republics, traditionally has 
been an arena where the Russian government could present its positions 
unchallenged by any of the other members.  However, although the CSTO’s 
declaration did diverge from the SCO’s statement by chastising both the 
Georgian government and NATO for creating the tensions which led to the 
conflict, the declaration’s language is fairly mild: “The CSTO member states call 
on NATO's nations to weigh up all possible consequences of the alliance's 
eastward expansion and the deployment of new missile defence facilities near 
the borders of member states.  The member states of the CSTO are deeply 
worried by the attempt undertaken by Georgia at resolving the conflict in South 
Ossetia by force, which resulted in numerous victims among the civilian 
population and peacekeepers and also brought with it serious humanitarian 
consequences.”  Support for Russia as regional peacemaker and guarantor of 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian security also was expressed.  However, later in 
the statement, the CSTO members stress that “frozen conflicts” should be 
resolved only via peaceful, diplomatic means.  The declaration also recommends 
working together with NATO to stem the flow of terrorism and illegal narcotics 
from Afghanistan and to promote increased stability there. (7) 
 
Thus, even within the parameters of an organization, which has been firmly 
under Russia’s thumb since its inception, Central Asia’s leaders were not willing 
to give public support to a policy of unilateral armed intervention against the 
territory of a sovereign state.  Instead, both the texts of the CSTO and SCO 
declarations continually emphasized the role of the UN and international 
cooperation in resolving regional and inter-state conflicts.  Concern over the 
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situation in Afghanistan also appeared to loom large on the member states’ 
minds.  As of today, Afghanistan seems to be becoming ever less stable and 
more lawless, and should that trend continue, it could have a very negative 
impact on the Central Asian countries, who already struggle with the violent 
effects of the opium and illegal weapons trade.  In the past, Afghanistan’s 
territory also has been the launching point for armed incursions into Central Asia 
by such groups as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). 
 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia undoubtedly produced shockwaves throughout all 
of the Central Asian leaderships, but rather than drawing them more closely into 
Russia’s economic and foreign policy orbit, out of fear for what the alternative 
might be, Russia’s actions appear to be pushing the Central Asian states further 
away.  China could well turn out to be the primary beneficiary of this outcome, as 
a government which is ready and willing to commit further investments to the 
region and which so far seems to offer a more reliable and stable partnership 
than what Russia’s leaders bring to the table. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Goodbye to Orange 
Ukraine’s sputtering “orange coalition” finally died for what is likely forever, this 
week.  No one is surprised.  It has been a slow, painful death.  
 
The sarcasm employed by Parliamentary Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk when 
announcing that the majority coalition officially had collapsed is indicative of the 
general mood of politicians and voters alike.  "I officially announce the dissolution 
of the coalition of democratic forces in the Verkhovna Rada … Anybody want to 
observe a moment of silence? Okay then, let's skip that part." (1) 
 
The majority coalition was created on 29 November 2007 between Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s eponymous bloc (BYuT) and the pro-presidential 
Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense bloc (OU-PSD).  Even at that time, many 
predicted a quick death for the grouping, based on the inherent tensions in the 
relationship between Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko.   The two 
have been erstwhile allies since Tymoshenko served as deputy prime minister in 
his cabinet in 2000.  Although they united to lead the Orange Revolution in 
 33 
November-December 2004, they later found themselves unable to work together 
effectively.  
 
The President dismissed Tymoshenko from her first stint as prime minister in 
September 2005 after only nine months in office, when the two could not agree 
on basic policies or the proper distribution of duties between them.  She returned 
to office in 2007 after snap parliamentary election results showed that her party 
had far outpaced OU-PSD, winning 32 percent of the vote compared to OU-
PSD’s 14 percent.  Even so, Yushchenko resisted forming a coalition with 
Tymoshenko for almost two months, as he flirted with his former presidential 
opponent, Viktor Yanukovych.  Public pressure finally forced him to accede to the 
Tymoshenko appointment and form a coalition with her bloc.   This reconstituted 
“orange coalition” provided a slim two vote majority over a left-leaning opposition 
coalition including Yanukovych’s eastern-based Party of Regions and the 
Communist Party. 
 
From day one, the coalition barely was effective.  Its only successes were 
pension and wage increases—which were not opposed by any party—and the 
passage of a series of regulatory procedures allowing the country to join the 
WTO.  A major campaign promise to remove parliamentary immunity failed when 
a portion of OU-PSD refused to support it.  Attempts to eliminate off-shore tax 
havens fell to defeat for the same reason.  A major privatization initiative died 
when it was vetoed by the President.  Investigations of major crimes, such as the 
murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000, went nowhere under a 
Prosecutor-General tied to Ukraine’s former corrupt pre-Orange Revolution 
regime.  Attempts by BYuT to replace the prosecutor failed, as did the bloc’s 
attempt to replace the disgraced Socialist head of the State Property Fund.  
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko may have had a coalition, but they never had 
unity. 
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Parliamentarians now have 30 days to form a new majority. If they cannot, 
Yushchenko has the right—but not the duty—to dissolve parliament and call 
snap elections.  They would be the third parliamentary elections in three years, 
and the sixth round of voting for president or parliament since October of 2004. 
 
Logic would suggest that Yushchenko should avoid an election.  In all polls—and 
there are new surveys released almost every day—his bloc trails badly in third 
place. As things stand today, if his bloc runs as it is, it would receive between 
three and eight percent of the vote.   In contrast, BYuT would receive 21 to 25 
percent.  This would be a horrible embarrassment for Yushchenko.  
 
Then, why did Yushchenko order his parliamentary bloc to pull out of the 
coalition?  The president may be depending on Tymoshenko’s aversion to 
participating in yet another election.  An election would lead to new coalition 
negotiations and a new confirmation for prime minister.  Given Yushchenko’s 
past attempts to stop Tymoshenko from becoming prime minister and his 
willingness to work instead with Viktor Yanukovych, the fight to retain her position 
is likely to be brutal.  Meanwhile, the campaign would be expensive, draining 
resources less than two years before the presidential election.  Although 
Tymoshenko’s bloc is well-funded, it is far less well-funded than the Party of 
Regions and OU-PSD. 
 
In order to avoid this, Yushchenko may hope that Tymoshenko forms a new 
coalition with Yanukovych.  Were she to do this, BYuT would lose some portion 
of its support in western areas of the country, where Yanukovych is despised as 
a relic of the pre-Orange era.  Yushchenko may be the beneficiary of these lost 
Tymoshenko votes.  As the president attempts to rebuild his support in advance 
of the 2010 presidential election, he may see it as essential that Tymoshenko’s 
support in western Ukraine be undermined. 
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But the question is – how much support would she really lose in western 
regions?  Tymoshenko has shown herself adept at explaining her actions and 
couching decisions in terms acceptable to voters.  Furthermore, over the last four 
years, she has built up substantial credibility with the public as the politician 
working most consistently toward “orange” ideals.  It is this credibility that has led 
to her bloc’s increase of support from seven percent in 2002 to 32 percent in 
2008.  These things may mediate her losses, as would expected increases in 
support in eastern areas.  
 
Still, Tymoshenko once suggested that she would unite with Yanukovych only if 
“aliens take me on their flying saucer, carry out illegal experiments on me, and 
wipe out my memory and mind.”  Upon hearing of a potential Tymoshenko-
Yanukovych alliance, the UNIAN News Agency announced that Tymoshenko 
apparently had visited with the aliens. (2)  Such a reversal in policy is bound to 
have implications with the electorate. 
 
However, a coalition between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych might actually be 
the worst scenario for the president, despite his apparent desire for it.  This 
coalition would provide 331 seats – well above a constitutional majority.   
Theoretically, they could do whatever they wanted to the constitution, including 
eliminating the presidency altogether.   Both Tymoshenko and Yankovych have 
had very difficult relations with Yushchenko and it is hard to believe that they 
wouldn’t take the opportunity to undermine him. 
 
By withdrawing from the “orange coalition,” Yushchenko then has left himself with 
several equally bad possibilities: (a) losing a parliamentary election, (b) facing 
Tymoshenko as a radical opposition leader, or (c) dealing with a constitutional 
majority prepared to undermine his powers completely. 
 
The president now says that Tymoshenko and Yanukovych already had joined 
together in parliament to reduce his power by removing his unilateral ability to 
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dismiss the prosecutor general, and by detailing presidential impeachment 
procedures.  However, in the grand scheme, these legal changes are minimal.   
In fact, Tymoshenko supported the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers earlier this 
year that turned over many of her duties to the president.  Furthermore, the 
president has the right to challenge these changes in the Constitutional Court. 
 
Given the potential difficulties these two powerful forces could create should they 
chose to do so, it is in the president’s interest to negotiate and attempt to find 
accommodation with his prime minister.  Instead, he has attacked her both 
rhetorically and legally. 
 
On 18 September, Tymoshenko reported to the Prosecutor-General’s office for 
the second time, ostensibly to answer questions about Yushchenko’s poisoning.  
Few believe she knows anything about this unsolved and entirely politicized 
case.  Her first interrogation lasted over five hours.  This tactic smacks of 
persecution of a rival and desperation in the face of falling support.  The 
prosecutor also recently has tried to question a former Yushchenko ally who is 
now criticizing him, as well as the Interior Minister, who now supports 
Tymoshenko. 
 
As all of this occurs, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-People’s Self Defense bloc has 
fractured over his actions.  PSD now allies most closely with the Bloc of Yulia 
Tymoshenko and has difficult relations with the majority of Yushchenko’s 
representatives.  
 
Yushchenko closest allies also announced a new “party” within the OU-PSD bloc.  
This party undermines Yushchenko’s “indignation” at Tymoshenko for 
supposedly allying with the Party of Regions.  The new “United Center” favors 
close ties to the oligarchs within the Party of Regions and likely will support a 
new “political project” financed by these oligarchs. It is probable that Speaker 
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Yatsenyuk and Raisa Bohateryova (Yushchenko’s National Security Council 
Secretary and a former Party of Regions member) will join this endeavor.  
 
Experts suggest that, should no coalition be formed, an election will be held on 
21 December.  Speaking on BBC’s Hardtalk, Vice Prime Minister Hryhoriy 
Nemyria suggested that this would be “the worst case scenario” for the country 
and called again for Yushchenko’s allies to return to the coalition.  Few believe 
they will. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Yatsenyuk officially buried the coalition,” Ukrayinska Pravda, 1020 CET, 16 
Sep 08. 
(2) UNIAN News Agency, 1343 GMT, 5 Sep 08. 
(3)  BBC Hardtalk, 17 Sep 08 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/7620824.stm. 
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